Choosing from a large tournament

  title={Choosing from a large tournament},
  author={Mark Fey},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
A tournament can be viewed as a majority preference relation without ties on a set of alternatives. In this way, voting rules based on majority comparisons are equivalent to methods of choosing from a tournament. We consider the size of several of these tournament solutions in tournaments with a large but finite number of alternatives. Our main result is that with probability approaching one, the top cycle set, the uncovered set, and the Banks set are equal to the entire set of alternatives in… CONTINUE READING

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