Choices, Values, and Frames

@inproceedings{Kahneman2000ChoicesVA,
  title={Choices, Values, and Frames},
  author={Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky},
  year={2000}
}
We discuss the cognitive and the psy- chophysical determinants of choice in risky and risk- less contexts. The psychophysics of value induce risk aversion in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses. The psychophysics of chance induce overweighting of sure things and of improbable events, relative to events of moderate probability. De- cision problems can be described or framed in multiple ways that give rise to different preferences, contrary to the invariance criterion of… 

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