Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: An experimental study

@article{Chen2019ChineseCA,
  title={Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: An experimental study},
  author={Y. Chen and Onur Kesten},
  journal={Games Econ. Behav.},
  year={2019},
  volume={115},
  pages={83-100}
}
  • Y. Chen, Onur Kesten
  • Published 2019
  • Psychology, Computer Science
  • Games Econ. Behav.
  • Abstract Since 2001, many Chinese provinces have transitioned from a “sequential” to a “parallel” school choice or college admissions mechanism. Inspired by this natural experiment, we evaluate the sequential (immediate acceptance, IA), parallel (PA), and deferred acceptance (DA) mechanisms in the laboratory. We find that participants are most likely to reveal their preferences truthfully under DA, followed by PA and then DA. While stability comparisons also follow the same order, efficiency… CONTINUE READING
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