Corpus ID: 15538782

Chinese College Admissions and School Choice Reforms: Theory and Experiments

@inproceedings{Chen2014ChineseCA,
  title={Chinese College Admissions and School Choice Reforms: Theory and Experiments},
  author={Y. Chen and Onur Kesten},
  year={2014}
}
  • Y. Chen, Onur Kesten
  • Published 2014
  • Geography
  • Within the last decade, many Chinese provinces have transitioned from the ‘sequential’ to the ‘parallel’ college admissions mechanisms. We show that all of the provinces that have abandoned the sequential mechanism have moved towards less manipulable and more stable mechanisms. Furthermore, Tibet implements the least manipulable parallel mechanism, whereas Beijing, Gansu and Shangdong have adopted the most manipulable versions. In the laboratory, participants are most likely to reveal their… CONTINUE READING
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