Chinese College Admissions and School Choice Reforms: A Theoretical Analysis

@article{Chen2017ChineseCA,
  title={Chinese College Admissions and School Choice Reforms: A Theoretical Analysis},
  author={Y. Chen and Onur Kesten},
  journal={Journal of Political Economy},
  year={2017},
  volume={125},
  pages={99 - 139}
}
  • Y. Chen, Onur Kesten
  • Published 2017
  • Economics
  • Journal of Political Economy
  • Each year approximately 10 million high school seniors in China compete for 6 million seats through a centralized college admissions system. Within the last decade, many provinces have transitioned from a “sequential” to a “parallel” mechanism to make their admissions decisions. In this study, we characterize a parametric family of application-rejection assignment mechanisms, including the sequential, deferred acceptance, and parallel mechanisms in a nested framework. We show that all of the… CONTINUE READING
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