Chimerical colors: some phenomenological predictions from cognitive neuroscience

  title={Chimerical colors: some phenomenological predictions from cognitive neuroscience},
  author={Paul M. Churchland},
  journal={Philosophical Psychology},
  pages={527 - 560}
  • P. Churchland
  • Published 1 October 2005
  • Biology
  • Philosophical Psychology
The Hurvich–Jameson (H–J) opponent-process network offers a familiar account of the empirical structure of the phenomenological color space for humans, an account with a number of predictive and explanatory virtues. Its successes form the bulk of the existing reasons for suggesting a strict identity between our various color sensations on the one hand, and our various coding vectors across the color-opponent neurons in our primary visual pathways on the other. But anti-reductionists standardly… 
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