Chemical Game Theory

  title={Chemical Game Theory},
  author={Darrell Velegol and Paul Suhey and John Connolly and Natalie Morrissey and Laura Cook},
  journal={Industrial \& Engineering Chemistry Research},
The purpose of this paper is to describe a new framework for representing and solving strategic game theory problems. This framework, called “Chemical Game Theory” (CGT), uses well-known, rigorous ... 
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  • T. Veloz
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    Foundations of Science
  • 2019
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Robust static output feedback Nash strategy for uncertain Markov jump linear stochastic systems
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Contractual Supply Chain Governance, Relational Supply Chain Governance and Performance Of Agro Processing Firms In Kenya
Agro processing industry establishes the biggest bit of 38% of Kenya manufacturing sector, but has untapped potential to contribute to employment and gross domestic product growth. The sector is
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Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games.
  • J. Nash
  • Economics
    Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
  • 1950
One may define a concept of an n -person game in which each player has a finite set of pure strategies and in which a definite set of payments to the n players corresponds to each n -tuple of pure
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Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
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