Cheap talk with multiple audiences: An experimental analysis

@article{Battaglini2014CheapTW,
  title={Cheap talk with multiple audiences: An experimental analysis},
  author={Marco Battaglini and Uliana Makarov},
  journal={Games Econ. Behav.},
  year={2014},
  volume={83},
  pages={147-164}
}
We examine strategic information transmission in a controlled laboratory experiment of a cheap talk game with one sender and multiple receivers. We study the change in equilibrium behavior from the addition of another audience as well as from varying the degree of conflict between the sender’s and receivers’ preferences. We find that, as in cheap talk games with just one receiver, information transmission is higher in games with a separating equilibrium, than in games with only a babbling… CONTINUE READING

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