Characterizations of perfect recall

@article{AlsFerrer2017CharacterizationsOP,
  title={Characterizations of perfect recall},
  author={Carlos Al{\'o}s-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger},
  journal={Int. J. Game Theory},
  year={2017},
  volume={46},
  pages={311-326}
}
This paper considers the condition of perfect recall for the class of arbitrarily large discrete extensive form games. The known definitions of perfect recall are shown to be equivalent even beyond finite games. Further, a qualitatively new characterization in terms of choices is obtained. In particular, an extensive form game satisfies perfect recall if and only if the set of choices, viewed as sets of ultimate outcomes, fulfill the “Trivial Intersection” property, that is, any two choices… CONTINUE READING
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