Characterization of Group-Fair Social Choice Rules under Single-Peaked Preferences

  title={Characterization of Group-Fair Social Choice Rules under Single-Peaked Preferences},
  author={Gogulapati Sreedurga and Soumya Sadhukhan and Souvik Roy and Y. Narahari},
We study fairness in social choice settings under single-peaked preferences. Construction and characterization of social choice rules in the single-peaked domain has been extensively studied in prior works. In fact, in the single-peaked domain, it is known that unanimous and strategy-proof deterministic rules have to be min-max rules and those that also satisfy anonymity have to be median rules. Further, random social choice rules satisfying these properties have been shown to be convex… 

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