Characterisation of Strongly Stable Matchings

  title={Characterisation of Strongly Stable Matchings},
  author={Adam Kunysz and Katarzyna E. Paluch and Pratik Ghosal},
  booktitle={ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms},
An instance of a strongly stable matching problem (SSMP) is an undirected bipartite graph G = (A∪B, E), with an adjacency list of each vertex being a linearly ordered list of ties, which are subsets of vertices equally good for a given vertex. Ties are disjoint and may contain one vertex. A matching M is a set of vertex-disjoint edges. An edge (x, y) ∈ E\M is a blocking edge for M if x is either unmatched or strictly prefers y to its current partner in M, and y is either unmatched or strictly… 

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