Chapter Twenty-Five - Strategyproof Social Choice

@article{Barber2011ChapterT,
  title={Chapter Twenty-Five - Strategyproof Social Choice},
  author={Salvador Barber{\`a}},
  journal={Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare},
  year={2011},
  volume={2},
  pages={731-831}
}
  • S. Barberà
  • Published 2011
  • Economics
  • Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare
This chapter surveys the literature on strategy proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on social choice models. 
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