Chapter 7 Redundancy

Abstract

Our final concern with safeguards—trigger mechanisms that may induce compliance with the federal distribution of authority—is their imperfection, leading to inappropriate punishment frequency. With imperfect safeguards, the trigger may react too quickly, or not at all. If they fail to react, then the system’s ability to maintain compliance is reduced. On the other hand, punishment can be too frequent. Although the equilibria derived in Chapters 3 and 4 acknowledged that punishment will occur even when no one deviated (beyond the tolerated level of non-compliance), if the safeguard is flawed, punishing too frequently (more than efficient), frustration with the system mounts, and the union cannot be sustained as member governments exit. Referring to the baseline model of safeguards in Chapter 4, a safeguard’s imperfection has two sources: a signal—observation (ω)—which is the safeguard’s impression of reality, distorted by noise, and a threshold (T ). The latter imperfection arises because safeguards are not necessarily designed efficiently. Instead, safeguards are often political creatures, or designed for other purposes, or have interests of their own that are tangential to the compliance problem. To induce the optimal degree of compliance with the distribution of

Cite this paper

@inproceedings{Bednar2006Chapter7R, title={Chapter 7 Redundancy}, author={Jenna Bednar}, year={2006} }