Chapter 41 Strategic equilibrium

@article{Damme2002Chapter4S,
  title={Chapter 41 Strategic equilibrium},
  author={E. Damme},
  journal={Handbook of Game Theory With Economic Applications},
  year={2002},
  volume={3},
  pages={1521-1596}
}
  • E. Damme
  • Published 2002
  • Computer Science
  • Handbook of Game Theory With Economic Applications
  • Abstract This chapter of the Handbook of Game Theory (Vol. 3) provides an overview of the theory of Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The starting-point is the rationalistic approach to games and the question whether there exists a convincing, self-enforcing theory of rational behavior in non-cooperative games. Given the assumption of independent behavior of the players, it follows that a self-enforcing theory has to prescribe a Nash equilibrium, i.e., a strategy profile such that no player… CONTINUE READING
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