Centralized and Decentralized Decision Making in Organizations

  title={Centralized and Decentralized Decision Making in Organizations},
  author={J{\'a}n Z{\'a}bojn{\'i}k},
  journal={Journal of Labor Economics},
  pages={1 - 22}
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