• DOI:10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00128-7
Corpus ID: 13537868

Central Bank Independence, Centralization of Wage Bargaining, Inflation and Unemployment - Theory and Some Evidence

@article{Cukierman1998CentralBI,
  title={Central Bank Independence, Centralization of Wage Bargaining, Inflation and Unemployment - Theory and Some Evidence},
  author={A. Cukierman and F. Lippi},
  journal={European Economic Review},
  year={1998},
  volume={43},
  pages={1395-1434}
}

A. Cukierman, F. Lippi

Published 1998

Economics

European Economic Review

This paper proposes a conceptual framework that makes it possible to investigate the effects of central bank independence, the degree of centralization of wage bargaining and the interaction between those institutional variables on the real wage, unemployment and inflation. This is done by considering a two-stage strategic interaction between a central bank (CB) with a given degree of conservativeness and a number of unions each of which sets its own nominal wage taking the nominal wages of… CONTINUE READING

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