• Economics
  • Published 2010

Central Bank Independence, Bureaucratic Corruption and Fiscal Responses - Empirical Evidence

@inproceedings{Dimakou2010CentralBI,
  title={Central Bank Independence, Bureaucratic Corruption and Fiscal Responses - Empirical Evidence},
  author={Ourania Dimakou},
  year={2010}
}
This paper analyses the impact of bureaucratic corruption on fiscal policy outcomes for economies that have constituted to a greater or lessen extent independent central banks. The adverse implications of corruption on debt accumulation are verified using a cross-sectional setting of 77 developed and developing countries. Approximating central bank independence as that point in time that a major central bank reform took effect, we find that more corruption leads to higher debt accumulation… CONTINUE READING

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