Causal and Logical Necessity in Malebranche's Occasionalism

  title={Causal and Logical Necessity in Malebranche's Occasionalism},
  author={A. R. J. Fisher},
  journal={Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
  pages={523 - 548}
  • A. Fisher
  • Published 1 January 2011
  • Philosophy
  • Canadian Journal of Philosophy
The famous Cartesian Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) espoused the occasionalist doctrine that ‘there is only one true cause because there is only one true God; that the nature or power of each thing is nothing but the will of God; that all natural causes are not true causes but only occasional causes’ (LO, 448, original italics). One of Malebranche's well-known arguments for occasionalism, known as, the ‘no necessary connection’ argument (or, NNC) stems from the principle that ‘a true cause… is… 
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