Cascade control and defense in complex networks.

@article{Motter2004CascadeCA,
  title={Cascade control and defense in complex networks.},
  author={A. Motter},
  journal={Physical review letters},
  year={2004},
  volume={93 9},
  pages={
          098701
        }
}
  • A. Motter
  • Published 2004
  • Computer Science, Medicine, Physics
  • Physical review letters
Complex networks with a heterogeneous distribution of loads may undergo a global cascade of overload failures when highly loaded nodes or edges are removed due to attacks or failures. Since a small attack or failure has the potential to trigger a global cascade, a fundamental question regards the possible strategies of defense to prevent the cascade from propagating through the entire network. Here we introduce and investigate a costless strategy of defense based on a selective further removal… Expand

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