Cartels As Rational Business Strategy: New Data Demonstrates That Crime Pays

  title={Cartels As Rational Business Strategy: New Data Demonstrates That Crime Pays},
  author={Robert H. Lande},
Cartels have always been the highest concern of antitrust. They overcharge consumers many billions of dollars every year and there is a strong consensus that they should be sanctioned heavily. Yet, until now no one has ever seriously attempted to analyze whether cartel sanctions are at the optimal level. This article is the first to undertake this formidable task. Rather surprisingly, it demonstrates that the combined level of United States cartel sanctions has been only 7% to 17% as large as… 

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