Corpus ID: 6666634

Cartels, Corporate Compliance and What Practitioners Really Think About Enforcement

@article{Sokol2012CartelsCC,
  title={Cartels, Corporate Compliance and What Practitioners Really Think About Enforcement},
  author={D. Sokol},
  journal={White Collar Crime eJournal},
  year={2012}
}
  • D. Sokol
  • Published 2012
  • Business
  • White Collar Crime eJournal
This article shows the limitations to the optimal deterrence-inspired cartel enforcement policy currently used by the Department of Justice Antitrust Division. This article employs both quantitative and qualitative survey evidence of cartel practitioners to shed light upon the realities of US cartel enforcement policy. The empirical evidence provided by the practitioner surveys challenges the traditional assumptions behind the success of the DOJ’s cartel program. Perhaps the most interesting… Expand
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