Carnap on concept determination: methodology for philosophy of science

  title={Carnap on concept determination: methodology for philosophy of science},
  author={James Justus},
  journal={European Journal for Philosophy of Science},
  • James Justus
  • Published 2012
  • Philosophy
  • European Journal for Philosophy of Science
Recent criticisms of intuition from experimental philosophy and elsewhere have helped undermine the authority of traditional conceptual analysis. As the product of more empirically informed philosophical methodology, this result is compelling and philosophically salutary. But the negative critiques rarely suggest a positive alternative. In particular, a normative account of concept determination—how concepts should be characterized—is strikingly absent from such work. Carnap's underappreciated… Expand
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