Carnap and logical truth

  title={Carnap and logical truth},
  author={W. V. Quine},
  • W. Quine
  • Published 1 December 1960
  • Philosophy
  • Synthese
Kant’s question ‘How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?’ precipitated the Critique of Pure Reason. Question and answer notwithstanding, Mill and others persisted in doubting that such judgments were possible at all. At length some of Kant’s own clearest purported instances, drawn from arithmetic, were sweepingly disqualified (or so it seemed; but see § II) by Frege’s reduction of arithmetic to logic. Attention was thus forced upon the less tendentious and indeed logically prior question… 

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