Career Concerns and the Dynamics of Electoral Accountability

  title={Career Concerns and the Dynamics of Electoral Accountability},
  author={Matias Iaryczower and Adam Meirowitz and Gabriel L{\'o}pez‐Moctezuma},
  journal={SSRN Electronic Journal},
Quantifying the value that legislators give to reelection relative to policy is crucial to understanding electoral accountability. We estimate the preferences for office and policy of members of the US Senate, using a structural approach that exploits variation in polls, position-taking and advertising throughout the electoral cycle. We then combine these preference estimates with estimates of the electoral effectiveness of policy moderation and political advertising to quantify electoral… 

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Preferences and Incentives of Appointed and Elected Public Officials: Evidence from State Trial Court Judges

  • C. Lim
  • Economics, Political Science
  • 2013
We study how two selection systems for public officials, appointment and election, affect policy outcomes, focusing on state court judges and their criminal sentencing decisions. First, under