Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility

@article{Harsanyi1955CardinalWI,
  title={Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility},
  author={John C. Harsanyi},
  journal={Journal of Political Economy},
  year={1955},
  volume={63},
  pages={309 - 321}
}
  • J. Harsanyi
  • Published 1 August 1955
  • Journal of Political Economy
I T HE naive concept of social welfare as a sum of intuitively measurable and comparable individual cardinal utilities has been found unable to withstand the methodological criticism of the Pareto school. Professor Bergson2 has therefore recommended its replacement by the more general concept of a social welfare function, defined as an arbitrary mathematical function of economic (and other social) variables, of a form freely chosen according to one's personal ethical (or political) value… 
Aggregation Without Interpersonal Comparisons of Well‐Being
Harsanyi (1955) claimed to derive “an additive cardinal social welfare function” from principles of individual and social rationality and respect for rational preferences. According to Harsanyi’s
WELFARISM AND FAIRNESS
The core idea of utilitarianism for Bentham is to establish that only individual utilities count in social welfare. There can be two distinct interpretations of this apparently simple principle.
Utilitarianism with and without expected utility
We give two social aggregation theorems under conditions of risk, one for constant population cases, the other an extension to variable populations. Intra and interpersonal comparisons are encoded in
Utilitarianism, Voting And The Redistribution Of Income
Utilitarianism can be misplaced or ambiguous. As a prescription for individual behaviour, the injunction to seek the greatest good for the greatest number is misplaced because there remains a domain
Quantity, quality, equality: introducing a new measure of social welfare
  • Karin Enflo
  • Computer Science, Economics
    Soc. Choice Welf.
  • 2021
TLDR
By satisfying the six conditions, the measure improves on previously proposed measures, such as the utilitarian Total and Average measures, as well as different kinds of Prioritarian measures.
Consistent updating of social welfare functions
TLDR
It is argued that this is not an appealing principle for collective decision making, and that bygones have necessary and substantive roles, and proposes a dynamic constraint which is acceptable even after rejecting the principle that one should be forward-looking.
Individual sense of justice and Harsanyi’s impartial observer
We revisit, within Harsanyi’s impartial observer setting, the question of foundations underlying procedural fairness concerns in welfare judgments. In our setup—that of allocating an indivisible good
Nash welfarism and the distributive implications of informational constraints
We study two informational simplicity conditions for aggregating von Neumann–Morgenstern preferences. When the best relevant alternative for each individual cannot be ascertained with confidence (as
Are Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility Indeterminate?
On the orthodox view in economics, interpersonal comparisons of utilityare not empirically meaningful, and ``hence'' impossible. To reassess this view, this paper draws onthe parallels between the
Just society
I examine the foundations of a just society using the lens of decision theory. The conception of just society is from an individual’s viewpoint: where would I rather live if I have an equal chance of
...
1
2
3
4
5
...