Capture by Threat

  title={Capture by Threat},
  author={Eser Durukal Bo},
We analyze a simple stochastic environment where policymakers can be threatened by ”nasty” interest groups. In the absence of these groups, the policymaker’s desire for reelection guarantees that good policies are implemented for every realization of the shock. When pressure groups can harass the policymaker, good policies will be chosen for only a subset of states of nature. In order to enlarge this subset, the public will often ...nd it convenient to elect ”strong” political leaders, increase… CONTINUE READING

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