• Corpus ID: 238259056

Capacity Expansion in the College Admission Problem

  title={Capacity Expansion in the College Admission Problem},
  author={Federico Bobbio and Margarida Carvalho and Andrea Lodi and Alfredo Torrico},
The college admission problem plays a fundamental role in several real-world allocation mechanisms such as school choice and supply chain stability. The classical framework assumes that the capacity of each college is known and fixed in advance. However, increasing the quota of even a single college would improve the overall cost of the students. In this work, we study the problem of finding the college capacity expansion that achieves the best cost of the students, subject to a cardinality… 

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