Capacity Constraints and the Inevitability of Mediators in Adword Auctions

@inproceedings{Singh2007CapacityCA,
  title={Capacity Constraints and the Inevitability of Mediators in Adword Auctions},
  author={Sudhir Kumar Singh and Vwani P. Roychowdhury and Himawan Gunadhi and Behnam Attaran Rezaei},
  booktitle={WINE},
  year={2007}
}
One natural constraint in the sponsored search advertising framework arises from the fact that there is a limit on the number of available slots, especially for the popular keywords, and as a result, a significant pool of advertisers are left out. We study the emergence of diversification in the adword market triggered by such capacity constraints in the sense that new market mechanisms, as well as, new for-profit agents are likely to emerge to combat or to make profit from the opportunities… 
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