Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice *

  title={Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice *},
  author={Lars Ehlers and John A. Weymark},
A desirable property of a voting procedure is that it be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a candidate for election. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) have established a number of theorems which demonstrate that this condition is incompatible with some other desirable properties of voting procedures. This article shows that Grether and Plott’s nonbinary generalization of Arrow’s Theorem can be used to provide simple proofs of two of these impossibility theorems. 
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Nonbinary social choice: an impossibility result

D. M. Grether, C. R. Plott
Review of Economic Studies 49, 143–149 • 1982
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Candidate stability and voting procedures

C. Rodŕıguez-Álvarez
Unpublished manuscript, Departament d’Economia i Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona • 2001
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Social choice and individual values, second edition

K. J. Arrow
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