Can the Knobe Effect Be Explained Away? Methodological Controversies in the Study of the Relationship Between Intentionality and Morality

@article{Cova2016CanTK,
  title={Can the Knobe Effect Be Explained Away? Methodological Controversies in the Study of the Relationship Between Intentionality and Morality},
  author={Florian Cova and Anthony Lantian and Jordane Boudesseul},
  journal={Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin},
  year={2016},
  volume={42},
  pages={1295 - 1308}
}
Based on the “Knobe Effect,” Knobe has argued that moral evaluations can influence intentionality judgments. However, two methodological objections have been raised against this claim: first, that participants’ answers do not accurately reflect what they think and, second, that the Knobe Effect can be fully explained by non-moral factors, such as the agent’s desires or beliefs. In this article, we discuss these two methodological objections to the existence of the Knobe Effect and provide new… 
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