Can the Government Compel Decryption?: Don't Trust - Verify

@article{Cohen2022CanTG,
  title={Can the Government Compel Decryption?: Don't Trust - Verify},
  author={Aloni Cohen and Sarah Scheffler and Mayank Varia},
  journal={Proceedings of the 2022 Symposium on Computer Science and Law},
  year={2022}
}
If a court knows that a respondent knows the password to a device, can the court compel the respondent to enter that password into the device? In this work, we propose a new approach to the foregone conclusion doctrine from Fisher v. U.S. that governs the answer to this question. The Holy Grail of this line of work would be a framework for reasoning about whether the testimony implicit in any action is already known to the government. In this paper we attempt something narrower. We introduce a… 
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