Can mixed strategies be stable in asymmetric games?

  title={Can mixed strategies be stable in asymmetric games?},
  author={Ken Binmore and Larry Samuelson},
  journal={Journal of theoretical biology},
  volume={210 1},
Selten (1980, J. theor. Biol. 84, 93(N)/01) has shown that mixed strategies cannot be evolutionarily stable in asymmetric games. Because every interaction features some asymmetry, this result apparently precludes mixed strategies in an evolutionary setting. In Maynard Smith's Hawk-Dove game (1982, Evolution and the theory of games (UP-Cambridge), for example, Selten's result restricts attention to pure-strategy evolutionarily stable outcomes in which the animals use the ability to condition… CONTINUE READING

From This Paper

Topics from this paper.
4 Citations
0 References
Similar Papers

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…