Can a Better Informed Listener be Easier to Persuade?

  title={Can a Better Informed Listener be Easier to Persuade?},
  author={Jacopo Bizzotto and Adrien Vigier},
  journal={ERN: Other Microeconomics: Asymmetric \& Private Information (Topic)},
We study the impact of exogenous news on the classic Bayesian persuasion problem. The sender supplies information over multiple periods, but is unable to commit at the onset to the information that she will supply in periods ahead. A tension then emerges between the sender and her future self. We show that by resolving this tension, more informative news can make the sender better off. 
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