Can We Manage First Impressions in Cooperation Problems? An Experimental

  title={Can We Manage First Impressions in Cooperation Problems? An Experimental},
  author={Christoph Engel and Sebastian Kube and Michael Kurschilgen},
  journal={ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics \& Collective Decision-Making (Topic)},
We study how cooperative behavior reacts to selective (favorable or unfavorable) pre-play information about the cooperativeness of other, unrelated groups within an experimental framework that is sufficiently rich for conflicting behavioral norms to emerge. We find that cooperation crucially depends on pre-play information, coinciding with a change in initial beliefs. Over time, behavior within both types of groups becomes increasingly homogeneous, indicating the formation of two rather… 
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