Corpus ID: 85504797

Can We Do without Fundamental Individuals ?

@inproceedings{Turner2014CanWD,
  title={Can We Do without Fundamental Individuals ?},
  author={Jason Turner},
  year={2014}
}
According to qualitativism, individuals aren’t ‘primitive’, or fundamental; all fundamental facts are purely qualitative. Some reasons to believe it are narrowly scientific, stemming from (for instance) concerns about quantum probabilities (cf. French and Krause, 2006, chs. 3–4). Others may be purely a priori, stemming from Berkelean qualms about the very idea of an individual abstracted from qualities. But I will follow Dasgupta by focusing on a broad scientific argument for qualitativism. It… Expand
Metaphysical Underdetermination as a Motivational Device
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Between Factualism and Substantialism: Structuralism as a Third Way
Qualitative Grounds

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