• Corpus ID: 6372883

Can Voters be Primed to Choose Better Legislators? Experimental Evidence from Rural India

@inproceedings{Banerjee2010CanVB,
  title={Can Voters be Primed to Choose Better Legislators? Experimental Evidence from Rural India},
  author={Abhijit Banerjee and Don Green and Jennifer Green},
  year={2010}
}
Ethnic politics and political corruption are important concerns in many developing country democracies. We conducted field experiments in rural India to examine the responsiveness of voter preferences to priming about the relevance of ethnicity and politician quality for service delivery. We used vignette experiments to examine how voter preferences vary with information about politician quality. We find strong evidence that ethnic preferences are malleable. The vignette experiments show that… 

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