Can Strong Boards and Trading Their Own Firm’s Stock Help CEOs Make Better Decisions? Evidence from Acquisitions by Overconfident CEOs

@article{Kolasinski2013CanSB,
  title={Can Strong Boards and Trading Their Own Firm’s Stock Help CEOs Make Better Decisions? Evidence from Acquisitions by Overconfident CEOs},
  author={A. Kolasinski and X. Li},
  journal={Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis},
  year={2013},
  volume={48},
  pages={1173-1206}
}
  • A. Kolasinski, X. Li
  • Published 2013
  • Business
  • Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
  • Little evidence exists on whether boards help managers make better decisions. We provide evidence that strong and independent boards help overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs) avoid honest mistakes when they seek to acquire other companies. In addition, we find that once-overconfident CEOs make better acquisition decisions after they experience personal stock trading losses, providing evidence that a manager’s recent personal experience, and not just educational and early career… CONTINUE READING
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