Can Informed Voters Enforce Better Governance? Experiments in Low Income Democracies

Abstract

This article evaluates a body of recent work which uses field and natural experiments to answer this question. A common finding in the literature is that voter behavior is malleable and that information about the political process and politician performance improves electoral accountability. Limited availability of information thus provides one explanation for the persistence of low quality politicians and the existence of identity politics and electoral malpractices in low-income democracies. Understanding how voters can gain access to credible sources of information and how politicians react to improved information about their performance are promising avenues for future

0510201520162017
Citations per Year

Citation Velocity: 7

Averaging 7 citations per year over the last 3 years.

Learn more about how we calculate this metric in our FAQ.

Cite this paper

@inproceedings{Pande2010CanIV, title={Can Informed Voters Enforce Better Governance? Experiments in Low Income Democracies}, author={Rohini Prabha Pande}, year={2010} }