Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq

@article{Berman2011CanHA,
  title={Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq},
  author={Eli Berman and Jacob N. Shapiro and Joseph H. Felter},
  journal={Journal of Political Economy},
  year={2011},
  volume={119},
  pages={766 - 819}
}
We develop and test an economic theory of insurgency motivated by the informal literature and by recent military doctrine. We model a three-way contest between violent rebels, a government seeking to minimize violence by mixing service provision and coercion, and civilians deciding whether to share information about insurgents. We test the model using panel data from Iraq on violence against Coalition and Iraqi forces, reconstruction spending, and community characteristics (sectarian status… 
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