Can Good Politicians Compensate for Bad Institutions? Evidence from an Original Survey of Italian Mayors

  title={Can Good Politicians Compensate for Bad Institutions? Evidence from an Original Survey of Italian Mayors},
  author={Maria Carreri},
  journal={FEN: Political Risk \& Corporate Finance (Topic)},
  • Maria Carreri
  • Published 1 November 2019
  • Political Science, Economics
  • FEN: Political Risk & Corporate Finance (Topic)
Can competent political leaders bring significant policy changes to communities otherwise doomed by “bad” informal institutions? This question has remained unanswered due to the lack of a convincing measure of politicians’ competence. I develop a novel survey technique to measure the administrative competence of executive politicians and apply it in interviews to 306 Italian mayors. I study the impact of mayors’ administrative competence on the policies they enact using a difference-in… 
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