Can Common Ownership Prevent the Tragedy of the Commons? An Experimental Investigation

  title={Can Common Ownership Prevent the Tragedy of the Commons? An Experimental Investigation},
  author={Klarizze Anne Puzon and Marc Georg Willinger},
  journal={SRPN: Other Sustainability \& Economics (Topic)},
We study experimentally a two-stage common pool resource game. In the first stage, selected members of the group determine the level of protection for the resource. The protected fraction of the resource is equally shared among group members. In the second stage, the unprotected fraction of the resource is competed for. We consider three institutions varying in the extent by which subjects participate in the first stage: vote (all group members participate), dictator (only one member decides… 


Voting for Burden Sharing Rules in Public Goods Games
We experimentally investigate whether groups of heterogeneous agents can reach an agreement on how to share the costs of providing a public good. Thereby, we explore the performance of different
Environmental versus Human-Induced Scarcity in the Commons: Do They Trigger the Same Response?
We study appropriation strategies in common pool resources where extinction is a credible threat. Here we present an experimental study of the appropriation of common pool resources in a dynamic
Freedom, Power and Interference: An Experiment on Decision Rights
We propose a theoretical foundation for preference for decision rights, driven by preference for freedom, power, and non-interference, which can lead subjects to value decision rights intrinsically,
Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible
Contemporary political theory often assumes that individuals cannot make credible commitments where substantial temptations exist to break them unless such commitments are enforced by an external
Going beyond panaceas
The articles in this special feature address how scholars and public officials can increase the prospects for future sustainable resource use by facilitating a diagnostic approach in selecting appropriate starting points for governance and monitoring, as well as by learning from the outcomes of new policies and adapting in light of effective feedback.
Rules, games, and common-pool resources
While the tragedy of the commons is real, there are many instances where institutions develop to protect against overexploitation. In this important work, the authors explore empirically,