Can Catch Shares Prevent Fisheries Collapse?

  title={Can Catch Shares Prevent Fisheries Collapse?},
  author={Christopher Costello and Steven D. Gaines and John Lynham},
  pages={1678 - 1681}
Recent reports suggest that most of the world's commercial fisheries could collapse within decades. Although poor fisheries governance is often implicated, evaluation of solutions remains rare. Bioeconomic theory and case studies suggest that rights-based catch shares can provide individual incentives for sustainable harvest that is less prone to collapse. To test whether catch-share fishery reforms achieve these hypothetical benefits, we have compiled a global database of fisheries… 

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