Calibrated Learning and CorrelatedEquilibriumDean

  title={Calibrated Learning and CorrelatedEquilibriumDean},
  author={P................... and FosterUniversity and of and PennsylvaniaPhiladelphia and V. Rakesh and VohraOhio},
Then, the limit points of the sequence of plays are correlated equilibria. In fact, for each correlated equilibrium there is some calibrated learning rule that the players can use which results in their playing this correlated equilibrium in the limit. Thus, the statistical concept of a calibration is strongly related to the game theoretic concept of correlated equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72,D83,C44. Q 1997 Academic Press 

From This Paper

Topics from this paper.
3 Citations
7 References
Similar Papers


Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-7 of 7 references

Game Theory and Economic Modeling,’

  • D. Kreps
  • 1991
Highly Influential
3 Excerpts

The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation

  • B. Skyrms
  • 1990
1 Excerpt

Self-Calibrating Priors Do Not Exist,’

  • D. Oakes
  • J. Amer. Statist. Assoc
  • 1985
2 Excerpts

On the Convergence of the Learning Process in a 2 = 2 Non-zero-Sum Two-Person Game,’

  • K. Miyasawa
  • Research Memo
  • 1961

\ Coherent Behavior in NoncooperativeGames

  • R. F. Nau
  • 1961

A Vector Valued Analog of the Mini]Max Theorem,’

  • D. Blackwell
  • Pacific J. Math
  • 1956

An Iterative Method of Solving a Game,’

  • J. Robinson
  • Ann. of Math
  • 1951

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…