Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium

@article{Foster1996CalibratedLA,
  title={Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium},
  author={Dean P. Foster and Rakesh V. Vohra},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  year={1996},
  volume={21},
  pages={40-55}
}
Abstract Suppose two players repeatedly meet each other to play a game where 1. each uses a learning rule with the property that it is a calibrated forecast of the other's plays, and 2. each plays a myopic best response to this forecast distribution. Then, the limit points of the sequence of plays are correlated equilibria. In fact, for each correlated equilibrium there is some calibrated learning rule that the players can use which results in their playing this correlated equilibrium in the… Expand
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