Calibrated Bayes

  title={Calibrated Bayes},
  author={Roderick J. A. Little},
  journal={The American Statistician},
  pages={213 - 223}
  • R. Little
  • Published 1 August 2006
  • Mathematics
  • The American Statistician
The lack of an agreed inferential basis for statistics makes life “interesting” for academic statisticians, but at the price of negative implications for the status of statistics in industry, science, and government. The practice of our discipline will mature only when we can come to a basic agreement about how to apply statistics to real problems. Simple and more general illustrations are given of the negative consequences of the existing schism between frequentists and Bayesians. An… 
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