CT-wasm: type-driven secure cryptography for the web ecosystem

  title={CT-wasm: type-driven secure cryptography for the web ecosystem},
  author={C. Watt and John Renner and Natalie Popescu and S. Cauligi and D. Stefan},
  journal={Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages},
  pages={1 - 29}
  • C. Watt, John Renner, +2 authors D. Stefan
  • Published 2019
  • Computer Science
  • Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages
  • A significant amount of both client and server-side cryptography is implemented in JavaScript. Despite widespread concerns about its security, no other language has been able to match the convenience that comes from its ubiquitous support on the "web ecosystem" - the wide variety of technologies that collectively underpins the modern World Wide Web. With the introduction of the new WebAssembly bytecode language (Wasm) into the web ecosystem, we have a unique opportunity to advance a principled… CONTINUE READING
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