COLLECTIVE EPISTEMIC AGENCY

@article{Tollefsen2004COLLECTIVEEA,
  title={COLLECTIVE EPISTEMIC AGENCY},
  author={D. Tollefsen},
  journal={Southwest Philosophy Review},
  year={2004},
  volume={20},
  pages={55-66}
}
  • D. Tollefsen
  • Published 2004
  • Sociology
  • Southwest Philosophy Review
  • Who Knows? According to contemporary analytic epistemology only individuals do. This individualistic bias is present in standard analyses of knowledge. The “S” of “S knows that p” is always an individual cognizer. The idea that collectives could be genuine knowers has received little, if any, serious consideration. This form of epistemic individualism, call it epistemic agent individualism, seems to be motivated by the view that epistemology is about things that go on inside the head. As one… CONTINUE READING
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