CHOICE WITHOUT PREFERENCE. A Study of the History and of the Logic of the Problem of “Buridan's Ass”

@inproceedings{Rescher1960CHOICEWP,
  title={CHOICE WITHOUT PREFERENCE. A Study of the History and of the Logic of the Problem of “Buridan's Ass”},
  author={Nicholas Rescher},
  year={1960}
}
*A logical theory may be tested by its capacity for dealing with puzzles, and it is a wholesome plan, in thinking about logic, to stock the mind with äs many puzzles äs possible, since these serve mudi the same purpose äs is served by experiments in physical science." Bertrand Russell „In things which are absolutely indifferent there can be no choice and consequently no Option or will, since dioice must have some reason or prindple.* Leibniz I. The Problem Can a reasonable agent choose a course… 

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