• DOI:10.1515/kant.1960.51.1-4.142
• Corpus ID: 171037127

CHOICE WITHOUT PREFERENCE. A Study of the History and of the Logic of the Problem of “Buridan's Ass”

@inproceedings{Rescher1960CHOICEWP,
  title={CHOICE WITHOUT PREFERENCE. A Study of the History and of the Logic of the Problem of “Buridan's Ass”},
  author={Nicholas Rescher},
  year={1960}
}

• N. Rescher
• Published 1960
• Philosophy

*A logical theory may be tested by its capacity for dealing with puzzles, and it is a wholesome plan, in thinking about logic, to stock the mind with äs many puzzles äs possible, since these serve mudi the same purpose äs is served by experiments in physical science." Bertrand Russell „In things which are absolutely indifferent there can be no choice and consequently no Option or will, since dioice must have some reason or prindple.* Leibniz I. The Problem Can a reasonable agent choose a course of action, or an object, without a preference? It certainly appears on first view that this question must be answered in the negative. By the very concept of a "reasonable agent" it is requisite that such a person have reasons for his actions. And when a reasonable choice among alternatives is made, this must, it would surely seem, have to be based upon a preference for the object actually diosen v;s vis its possible alternatives. Where there is no preference, it would seem that no reason for a selection can exist, so that there apparently cannot be a reasonable way of making a dioice. This line of reasoning seems to establish the precept: No reasonable choice without a preference. However, despite the prima fade plausibility of this argument, it cannot be accepted äs fully correct. For there is a well-known, indeed notorious counter-example: the dilemma or paradox of Buridan's Ass. This mythical creature is a hypothetical animal, hungry, and positioned midwiay between essentially identical bundles of hay. There is assumed to be no reason why the animal should have a preference for one of the bundles of hay over the other. Yet it must eat one or the other of them, or eise starve. Under these circumstances, the creature will, being reasonable, prefer Having-one-bundle-of-hay to Having-no-bundle-of-hay. It therefore must choose one of the bundles. Yet there is, by hypothesis, simply no reason for preferring either bündle. It appears to follow that reasonable dioice must — somehow — be possible in the absence of preference. It should at once be noted that the problem of the identity of indiscernibles, famous because of its prominent role in the philosophy of Leibniz, has no bearing upon the matter here under discussion. For what is at issue in c£>$es of dioice without preierence, such äs the example of Buridan's ass, is not that there exists no difference between the objects