CEO Risk-Taking and Socioemotional Wealth: The Behavioral Agency Model, Family Control, and CEO Option Wealth

  title={CEO Risk-Taking and Socioemotional Wealth: The Behavioral Agency Model, Family Control, and CEO Option Wealth},
  author={L. Gomez-Mejia and I. Neacşu and Geoffrey P. Martin},
  journal={Journal of Management},
  pages={1713 - 1738}
We combine behavioral agency and family business literature to analyze the role of dominant firm principals in constraining the managerial agent’s (CEO’s) response to equity-based pay. Behavioral agency research has made progress in understanding CEO risk behavior in response to equity-based incentives and family firm risk behavior driven by concentrated socioemotional and financial firm-specific risk bearing. However, both literatures have evolved independently, which has limited our… Expand
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