CEO Outside Directorships and Firm Performance: A Reconciliation of Agency and Embeddedness Views

  title={CEO Outside Directorships and Firm Performance: A Reconciliation of Agency and Embeddedness Views},
  author={Marta A. Geletkanycz and Brian K. Boyd},
  journal={Academy of Management Journal},
A debate surrounds CEO outside board service and its contribution to firm performance. Agency scholars contend CEO outside directorships constitute a form of managerial opportunism that potentially detracts from internal responsibilities, but embeddedness scholars argue that directorship ties afford access to information and resources of important strategic utility. In an effort at reconciliation, we propose and test a midrange, contingency-based model receiving strong support in analysis of… 
Why Do Boards Let Their CEOs Take Outside Directorships? Entrenchment and Embeddedness
We study the supply side of the market for CEOs as outside board members in the context of increasing legal and shareholder pressure on CEOs to refrain from accepting outside directorships.
CEO attributes, investment decisions, and firm performance: New insights from upper echelons theory
The study examines the role of a CEO in enhancing a firm’s performance through the mediating effect of investment decisions in the emerging economy of Pakistan. Distinctly, fixed-effects panel
Interlocking directorships and firm performance in highly regulated sectors: the moderating impact of board diversity
Interlocking directorships are a pervasive element of the corporate landscape. Academic literature documents many examples of spreading business practices and strategic outcomes through this form of
The possible pitfalls of boards’ engagement in the strategic management process
Scholars endorsing the embeddedness outlook call for directors’ greater engagement in the strategic management process. In contrast, scholars endorsing the control outlook argue that directors should
Corporate Governance Reforms, Interlocking Directorship Networks and Company Value in Italy (1998-2007)
In this paper we contribute to the literature on the structure of interlocking directorship networks and to the literature on the relationship between corporate governance and performance. We use a
Deciding Who Will Rule: Examining the Influence of Outside Noncore Directors on Executive Entrenchment
This study shows that the association becomes more positive when these directors are highly embedded in the corporate elite network or have shorter board tenure but less positive when independent chief executive officer directors' equity ownership is high.
CEO Succession Origin and Firm Performance: A Multilevel Study
There has been much controversy concerning the relationship between outside CEO succession origin and firm performance. Some scholars take the organizational-adaptation view to highlight the benefits


Board Seat Accumulation by Executives: A Shareholder's Perspective
While reformers have argued that multiple directorships for executives can destroy value, we investigate firms with executives that accept an outside directorship and find negative announcement
The strategic value of CEO external directorate networks: implications for CEO compensation
This study examines the relationship between CEO external directorate networks and CEO compensation. Drawing on previous research showing a link between executives' external networks, firm strategy,
Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors
I study incentives received by outside directors in Fortune 500 firms from compensation, replacement, and the opportunity to obtain other directorships. Previous research has only shown these
The Significance of Board Interlocks for Corporate Governance
Boards of directors of large American corporations are marked by a surprising degree of overlap in their memberships. The median Fortune 500 firm interlocked (shared directors) with seven other large
Are Some Outside Directors Better than Others? Evidence from Director Appointments by Fortune 1000 Firms
I analyze 1,493 first-time director appointments to Fortune 1000 boards, during 1997-99, to investigate whether certain outside directors are better than others. Reactions to director appointments
Several studies have addressed the CEO duality-performance relationship, with inconsistent results. This paper proposes that these inconsistencies can be resolved by integrating agency and
The external ties of top executives: Implications for strategic choice and performance.
We are grateful to Eric Abrahamson, Ron Burt, Eric Leifer, Aneil Mishra, and Bob Yavitz for their contributions on earlier drafts of this manuscript. The paper has also benefited from the
Board Monitoring and Antitakeover Amendments
Abstract This study examines the joint influence of board composition, leadership structure, and board ownership structure on the market's reaction to corporate antitakeover amendment proposals. The